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Abstract
This article shows that in the presence of environmental externalities, it
may be welfare enhancing to overcome a technological lock-in by a dead-
end technology through governmental intervention. It is socially desirable
to subsidize a dead-end technology if its environmental externality is small
relative to the one of the established technology, if the installed base and/or
the strength of the network effect is small and if future generations matter.
Applying our results to the private transport sector, governments promoting
alternatives to gasoline-driven vehicles have to be aware of these opposing
welfare effects.
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1 Introduction
The automobile industry is developing several alternatives for the established
petrol-driven internal combustion engine, for example, fuel cell, battery-driven
electro motor, or biofuel-driven engines. Up to now, none of these alternative
power trains have entered the mass market. Since the usability of a vehicle de-
pends on the network of service stations, there is a large lock-in effect that favors
the established technology. Even if some of the new technologies enter the market
and one of them becomes the dominant technology, then it can be entirely replaced
by another one at a later time. Likewise, at the end of the nineteenth century,
steam- and battery-driven vehicles dominated the infant automobile market before
the internal combustion engine succeeded. Therefore, even if the advantages of a
new technology are large, users may not abandon the old technology and switch
to the new technology when they fear that the new technology is a dead-end tech-
nology.
Many governments, such as the German, committed to reduce anthropogenic
greenhouse gases. Since the transport sector is one of the largest producers of
greenhouse gases, they try to reduce emissions from vehicles. In order to reach
the aim of a reduction of 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions up to 2020, they
advocate green technologies. Since a Pigou tax that internalizes the external effect
does not solve the lock-in advantage of the traditional technology, they consider
subsidizing vehicles with an alternative or greener technology. However, subsidiz-
ing a dead-end technology reduces the utility that users get from the established
one by destroying an established network of service stations.
This article deals with the interaction of service station networks, greenhouse
gas emissions, and uncertain technological progress by answering the following
question: Is it sensible to subsidize a green technology even if we know that it is
a dead-end technology, or is it preferable to just wait for the better technology?
By taking external environmental effects as well as network effects into account,
we identify the pre-conditions for welfare-enhancing subsidies of a dead-end tech-
nology. The external environmental effect arises from emitting greenhouse gases,
here short-living ones such as methane. Using a less polluting technology always
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reduces the external effect and, therefore, deserves subsidies. However, there is
an opposing network effect. To use a vehicle, the consumer depends on filling
and other service stations. Since the utility of an automobile user depends on the
density of a service infrastructure and the density of service stations depends on
the numbers of users, network effects do play a role. Subsidizing consumers into a
dead-end technology reduces the utility of all consumers in the old network.
Our methodical analysis relates to the literature of the economics of networks
(Economides, 1996; Birke, 2009). In particular, our model is based on the work
of Farrell and Saloner (1986) and follows Sartzetakis and Tsigaris (2005). Farrell
and Saloner (1986) show that due to an installed base, network effects can lead to
excess inertia; thus, a superior technology is not adopted. Sartzetakis and Tsigaris
(2005) amend the aspect of environmental externalities and apply the model to the
automobile sector. Although they analyze two technologies, they do not consider
dead-end technologies. Further, they are identifying policies to internalize the
external effect. We are assuming that a complete internalization of the external
environmental effect is not possible and instead search for a second-best policy.
Our analysis is based on the wide range of literature on the technological tran-
sition to alternative-fuel vehicles (Nishihara, 2010; Ko¨hler et al., 2010; Schneider
et al., 2004; Schwoon, 2007; Struben and Sterman, 2008). Some authors also take
environmental externalities into account. Internalizing environmental and network
externalities, Conrad (2009) shows the optimal path of investment chosen by the
firm. Similar to Sartzetakis and Tsigaris (2005), the author searches for an optimal
policy that we reckon as impossible. Modeling the adoption decision of consumers
and filling station owners, Greaker and Heggedal (2010) conclude that the gov-
ernment should internalize the environmental externalities via taxation. Due to a
difficulty in determining whether there is a lock-in situation or not, the authors
reject governmental intervention to internalize the network externality. We state
the existence of a lock-in situation, and, therefore, claim governmental action.
Others only consider network effects while analyzing different aspects within the
adoption process. For example, Bento (2010) focuses on the consumers’ decision
to buy a hybrid or a fuel cell vehicle. He stresses the role of network effects in
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the players’ decisions. He finds a risk of locking-in another technology within the
transitory process, whereas we stress the risk of not using a welfare-enhancing
dead-end technology.
2 One Green Technology
As in Sartzetakis and Tsigaris (2005), we assume that one infinitely lived automo-
bile user per time unit continuously arrives at the market. All users inelastically
demand a single car. No buyer of a car demands a different car in the future.
Users of the current technology D (dirty), here gasoline-driven vehicles, emit the
environmental externality D, that is, greenhouse gases with a short lifetime such
as methane. A benefit a is generated from the technology’s general characteristic
to meet mobility. Further, to use the technology, frequent use of service stations is
necessary, and users prefer a dense net of service stations. As the number of users
of a given technology increases, so does the number of service stations for this
particular technology. We assume that one service station opens up with every
new user of the corresponding technology and assume that automobile users gain
a benefit b from every other user of the network of D.
The technology D enters the market at period T0 = 0. Further, we assume
that the price of a car is normalized to zero. The net present value of the benefit
(NPV) of a new user arriving at time T if D is used up to infinity is
D(T ) =
∫ ∞
T
(a+ b · t)e−r(t−T ) dt (1)
=
a+ b · T
r
+
b
r2
, (2)
with r being the discount factor.
At time T ∗ > 1/r, a new technology, for example, electric mobility, is ready
for the market. Since it emits C < D less than the technology D, we call it clean
technology C. We assume that the new technology and the old technology are
equally well designed to serve the mobility needs of the users. However, due to
D′s already installed base T ∗−T0 = T ∗ at time T ∗ > 1/r, rational new users, who
4
do not consider the external benefit, do choose the old technology D, known as
excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner, 1986).1
The government may induce a switch toward the clean technology from T ∗ by
paying a subsidy sˆ for C users such that the benefit of buying C is not smaller
than the benefit of buying D. Let us assume that the government can commit to
a policy and the subsidy is successful in influencing all new users at T ≥ T ∗ to
choose C. For each user entering the market at T > T ∗, there already exists a
network of the size T − T ∗. The NPV of a user at time T ≥ T ∗ if C is used up to
infinity by all the following users equals
C(T ) =
∫ ∞
T
[a+ b(t− T ∗)]e−r(t−T ) dt (3)
=
a+ b (T − T ∗)
r
+
b
r2
. (4)
If all users from T ∗ use technology C, then the network of D stops growing.
Therefore, the NPV of a user choosing D at T > T ∗ if the last user of D was at
time T ∗ is
D˜(T ) =
∫ ∞
T
[a+ b(T ∗ − T0)]e−r(t−T ) dt (5)
=
a+ b · T ∗
r
. (6)
Figure 1 shows the network’s growth for both technologies over time. The thick
line describes the path of the D-network. It grows from T0 = 0 until T
∗ = 1, then
it stops growing. The dashed line outlines the D-path, if the second technology
does not appear. The thin line shows the path of the C-network. Starting at
T ∗ = 1, it has the same size such as technology D at 2T ∗ = 2. After that, it is
larger than the D-network.
1If T ∗ < 1/r, then buying C is optimal if users assume that all new users will buy C also.
Therefore, no subsidy is needed. That means, T ∗ = 1/r is the critical installed base. If the
network exceeds this size, then there is a lock-in that cannot be overcome without governmental
intervention (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985). In other related work, this is called critical mass (Witt,
1997).
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Figure 1: The one green technology scenario
Lemma 1 If the government pays the subsidy
sˆ(T ) =

b(2T ∗−T )
r
− b
r2
, for T ∗ ≤ T ≤ 2T ∗ − 1
r
0, for T ≥ 2T ∗ − 1
r
, (7)
then all users entering at T ≥ T ∗ choose C.
Proof: See Appendix.
As long as D˜(T ) > C(T ), the government has to pay the subsidy sˆ(T ). It com-
pensates the early C-users, because they cannot use the installed larger network
of technology D. This is calculated by b(2T
∗−T )
r
. Without this subsidy, it is not
rational to choose the cleaner technology C. Since the D-network stops growing
when then C-network starts growing, the compensation for the early C-users can
be reduced each period until 2T ∗− 1
r
; therefore, we have to subtract b
r2
. After this
time the government can stop paying it.
Proposition 1 Subsidizing the C technology is welfare enhancing if D − C ≥
2bT ∗.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that the government can enhance social welfare by over-
coming lock-in, thus by subsidizing the new green technology C. The condition
6
states the opposing effect of environmental benefit and network effect. The use
of the less emitting technology C reduces environmental externalities and, there-
fore, enhances welfare. On the other hand, since the utility of an automobile user
depends on the density of a service infrastructure, using technology C reduces
welfare, because it is not compatible to the installed D-network. Therefore, subsi-
dizing technology C is welfare enhancing, if the environmental benefit of using the
less emitting technology C is larger than the benefit of using the installed network.
3 Two Green Technologies
We now consider the case that, since technologies improve, at some time T ∗∗ >
2T ∗ − 1/r in the future, there will be a green (better) technology B, which is
compatible to the old technology D but has a smaller external effect B = 0 than
C, for example, a new generation of biofuels. Is it still sensible to subsidize the
technology C even if we know that it is a dead-end technology, or is it better to
just wait for the better technology and not to use or subsidize C?
To answer this question, we create a scenario where from T ∗ to T ∗∗ all users
choose C. Since T ∗ > 1/r, the D-network has reached its critical size; thus, there
is a lock-in situation. Therefore, the new users only choose C because of subsidies
that are paid by the government. Again, we assume that the government is able
to commit to its policy. Setting T0 = 0, the networks of D and the subsidized
C have the same size at 2T ∗. If T ∗∗ < 2T ∗, then the C-network is smaller than
the D-network at T ∗∗ and all later arriving users buy B. The government stops
supporting C. It is unclear as to when the new technology is ready for the market.
With a probability 0 < p < 1, the B-technology enters the market at T e. To
simplify calculations, we set T e = T ∗∗ = 2T ∗ − δ, with 0 < δ < 1/r. 2
Figure 2 shows the network’s growth for the three technologies in such a sce-
nario. The fat line describes the path of the D-network. Here, it increases from
T0 = 0 until T
∗ = 2. Then, it stops growing for the period T ∗ = 2, when C
is chosen, until 2T ∗ − δ = 3, when B enters the market. Then, it continues to
2Since T ∗∗ = 2T ∗ − δ > 2T ∗ − 1/r, it has to hold δ < 1/r.
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Figure 2: The scenario for T ∗∗ = 2T ∗ − δ
expand, because of the compatibility of technology B with the D-network. In this
scenario, the C-network never reaches the size of the D−B-network. As the thin
line shows, it only grows from T ∗ = 2 until 2T ∗ − δ = 3. After that, it remains at
the size reached at 2T ∗ − δ = 3.
However, if T ∗∗ > 2T ∗, then the subsidized network of C is larger than the
D-network. Even in this case, rational users switch to the B-technology without
subsidies, because δ < 1/r. 3 Therefore, the government has to subsidize C until
B arrives. With the probability 1 − p, technology B appears at T l > T e. For
simplification, we set T l = T ∗∗ = 2T ∗ + δ.
Figure 3 shows the network’s evolution of the three technologies in this scenario.
Here, technology B appears at 2T ∗ + δ = 5. Therefore, the C-network can exceed
the size of the D-network at T = 4. It stops growing when B enters the market,
and since the D−B network continues to expand, the later exceeds the former at
T = 6.
As just seen, since B arrives at a future period, the NPV for the users of D
changes as well. It does not end in T ∗, but continues to grow in T ∗∗ when B
appears. To calculate the NPV, we also have to take into account that this can
happen at two different points in time. Therefore, the NPV for one user of the
3If δ > 1/r, then the government also has to subsidize B.
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Figure 3: The scenario for T ∗∗ = 2T ∗ + δ
D-technology who enters the market at T < T ∗ adds up to
D2(T ) =
∫ T ∗
T
[a+ b · t]e−r(t−T ) dt (8)
+ p
(∫ 2T ∗−δ
T ∗
[a+ b · T ∗]e−r(t−T ) dt (9)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
[a+ b(t− (T ∗ − δ))]e−r(t−T ) dt
)
(10)
+ (1− p)
(∫ 2T ∗+δ
T ∗
[a+ b · T ∗]e−r(t−T ) dt (11)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
[a+ b(t− (T ∗ + δ))]e−r(t−T ) dt
)
(12)
=
a+ b · T
r
+
b(1− e−r(T ∗−T ) + p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) + (1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
.
(13)
From T ∗ onward in our scenario, all users choose technology C. Due to the arrival
of technology B, their benefit also changes. Now, they are ending in a dead
network. When this happens depends on the probability p. The NPV for one of
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these users appearing at T ∗ < T < T ∗∗ equals
C2(T ) =p
(∫ 2T ∗−δ
T
[a+ b(t− T ∗)] · e−r(t−T ) dt (14)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
[a+ b(T ∗ − δ)] · e−r(t−T ) dt
)
(15)
+ (1− p)
(∫ 2T ∗+δ
T
[a+ b(t− T ∗)] · e−r(t−T ) dt (16)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
[a+ b(T ∗ + δ)] · e−r(t−T ) dt
)
(17)
=
a+ b(T − T ∗)
r
+
b(1− p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) − (1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
. (18)
The NPV of the user choosing D at T ∗ < T < T ∗∗, if the last user of D was at
time T ∗, equals
D˜2(T ) =
a+ b · T ∗
r
+
b(p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) + (1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
. (19)
When technology B appears, the government will stop paying subsidies to the
C-users. Therefore, the government has to compensate the users of C not only for
not using the D-network, but also for ending in the dead network. Otherwise they
would choose D.
Lemma 2 If the government pays
sˆC(T ) =
b(2T ∗ − T )
r
− b
(
1− 2p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) − 2(1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
(20)
from T ∗ till T ∗∗, then all users entering at T ≥ T ∗ choose C.4
Proof: See Appendix.
As long as D˜2(T ) > C2(T ), the government has to pay the subsidy sˆC(T ).
This subsidy can be interpreted as in section 2. It compensates the C-users for
using a small network, which is calculated by b(2T
∗−T )
r
. Since the C-network grows,
whereas the D-network remains constant, the subsidy can be reduced each period.
4If δ ≥ ln(2)r , then all users choose C if the government pays sˆC(T ) from T ∗ to T ≤ 2T ∗ −
1+W (−2·e−1−rδ)
r and from T ≥ 2T ∗ − 1+W−1(−2·e
−1−rδ)
r till T
∗∗.
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This effect is described by − b
r2
. However, the C-users end in a dead network
after T ∗∗. The rest of the second term, 2p·e
−r(2T∗−δ−T )+2(1−p)·e−r(2T∗+δ−T )
r2
, can be
interpreted as the compensation for it. Again, the government decides at T ∗, so
the future payoffs are discounted by r.
At T ∗∗, technology B enters the market. Since δ < 1/r, technology B does not
have to be subsidized. Rational new users choose B, if they expect future users
are doing the same.
Welfare analysis The welfare W is defined as the sum of consumer rent as sum
of the utility from using the technology C or D or B (which is free of charge) minus
the external effect from using the technologies. The subsidies sˆC are payed by the
government and received by the consumers and, therefore, does change welfare
only indirectly by changing the type of technology used. Analyzing the change
in welfare due to the technological change, we have to look at the different paths
depending on the technology chosen.
Without subsidies, technology C cannot achieve in the market because of the
network externalities resulting from the service infrastructure of technology D.
New users will choose D from T ∗ on until technology B enters the market. Then,
they choose the better technology B. We assume -altruism.
Social welfare without subsidies equals
W =p ·
(∫ 2T ∗−δ
0
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b · τ − D] · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt+ (21)∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b · τ ] · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt
)
+ (22)
(1− p) ·
(∫ 2T ∗+δ
0
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b · τ − D] · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt+ (23)∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b · τ ] · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt
)
, (24)
which is the reference scenario in the following analysis. As just described, in this
scenario, all users choose technology D with the external effect D from T0 = 0
until T ∗∗ and from T ∗∗ on, they choose B with the external effect B = 0. The
first term calculates the welfare for the case that B arrives at the early time T e,
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whereas the second term calculates for the case that B arrives at the later T l.
Social welfare with subsidies equals
Wsˆ =WDsˆ +WCsˆ +WBsˆ , (25)
which is the alternative scenario for the government. In this scenario, we have
three types of users differing in the technology they are using. The first group
enters the market before T ∗ so that they have to take technology D. The second
group is the one choosing the C-technology, as they arrive at the later period from
T ∗ to T ∗∗. Finally, the users entering the market from T ∗∗ on use technology B.
To calculate the welfare for each of these groups, we also have to consider the two
possible times for B to appear. The welfare for the groups is separately calculated
as follows:
Social welfare for the group using technology D equals
WDsˆ(T
∗) =p ·
∫ T ∗
0
(∫ T ∗
t
[a+ b · τ − D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ+ (26)∫ 2T ∗−δ
T ∗
[a+ b · T ∗ − D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ+ (27)∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
[a+ b(τ − (2T ∗ − δ − T ∗)− D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ
)
dt (28)
+ (1− p) ·
∫ T ∗
0
(∫ T ∗
t
[a+ b · τ − D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ+ (29)∫ 2T ∗+δ
T ∗
[a+ b · T ∗ − D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ (30)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
[a+ b(τ − (2T ∗ + δ − T ∗)− D] · e−r(τ−T ) dτ
)
dt. (31)
(32)
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Social welfare for the group using technology C equals
WCsˆ(T
∗) =p ·
∫ 2T ∗−δ
T ∗
(∫ 2T ∗−δ
t
[a+ b(τ − T ∗)− C ]e−r(τ−T ) dτ (33)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
[a+ b(2T ∗ − δ − T ∗)− C ]e−r(τ−T ) dτ
)
dt (34)
+ (1− p) ·
∫ 2T ∗+δ
T ∗
(∫ 2T ∗+δ
t
[a+ b(τ − T ∗)− C ]e−r(τ−T ) dτ (35)
+
∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
[a+ b(2T ∗ + δ − T ∗)]e−r(τ−T ) dτ
)
dt. (36)
Social welfare for the group using technology B equals
WBsˆ(T
∗) =p ·
∫ ∞
2T ∗−δ
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b(τ − (2T ∗ − δ)− T ∗) · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt (37)
+ (1− p) ·
∫ ∞
2T ∗+δ
∫ ∞
t
[a+ b(τ − (2T ∗ + δ)− T ∗)] · e−r(τ−T ∗) dτdt.
(38)
At time T ∗, the government has to decide whether to pay subsidies or not.
Since the government maximizes social welfare, it should subsidize C if W ≤ Wsˆ
holds.
Proposition 2 If
D − C >−2b[T
∗ · er(T ∗+δ) + (1− p− p · e2rδ)δ]
1− p− er(T ∗+δ) + p · e2rδ = ˜, (39)
then W < Wsˆ, and it is welfare enhancing to subsidize the dead-end technology.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that even if technology C is a dead-ending one, it can
be socially desirable to subsidize its usage to overcome lock-in. By subsidizing
technology C, on the one hand, social welfare enhances due to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. However, on the other hand, subsidizing C reduces
social welfare as it is not compatible to the installed D-network. The consequence
of choosing technology C is the existence of two incompatible networks. Therefore,
the welfare-enhancing government should subsidize the dead-end technology C,
only if the reduction in the external effect exceeds the benefit of compatibility.
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Comparative statics The size of the critical ˜ depends on distinct factors.
Corollary 1 It holds δ˜
δb
> 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The parameter b describes the strength of the network effect. If the network
effect is large, then the larger has to be ∆ so that Ws > W holds. This describes
the relation between the benefit loss of incompatibility to the D-network and the
environmental benefit of using the cleaner technology C. If the network benefit
from the installed D-network is large, then the environmental benefit also has to
be large. Otherwise, it is not welfare enhancing to support the cleaner technology.
Corollary 2 It holds δ˜
δr
< 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The discounting factor r describes the evaluation of the future. If the future
is valued a lot, then the smaller can be ∆, and Ws > W still holds. With each
future period, the C-network grows, whereas the size of the D-network remains
constant. That means, the benefit loss of incompatibility abates over time, whereas
the emissions from the D-technology arise each period at a constant level. Thus,
the relative benefit of using the cleaner technology grows each period. A large
r values this benefit higher. Therefore, it is socially desirable to support C for
smaller ∆.
Corollary 3 It holds δ˜
δT ∗ > 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The later technology C enters the market, the larger ∆ has to be so that Ws >
W holds. If C arrives later in the market, then the installed base of technology D
is large. Therefore, the benefit loss of not using this network is large. As follows,
the environmental benefit of using C has to be large, that means, ∆ also has to
be large.
Our results can be applied to the case of electric mobility as the most subsidized
alternative to gasoline-driven vehicles. Corollary 1 and 3 state that intervention
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when the network effect is strong, for example, because the installed base is large,
is justified only if the environmental benefit is significant. Up to now, there ex-
ists no appropriate network of filling and service stations for electric cars. This
means that the network effect of the already installed service stations network for
gasoline-driven cars is large. Therefore, the greenhouse gas reduction of battery-
driven mobility also has to be large. Otherwise, a governmental intervention would
not enhance welfare. Considering the German mix of electricity production, emit-
ting on average 563g carbon dioxide per kWh, it would hardly enhance social
welfare to subsidize this technology. However, if the electricity could be gained
from low greenhouse gas emitting energy sources such as wind or solar, then the
usage of battery driven-vehicles would significantly reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sion. Further, we assumed (in order to stress our argument) a dead-end technology,
which means that it is already known that there is a better technology available
in the future. Up to now, it is not clear at all whether or not electric-driven
cars are a dead-end technology. The subsidization of an open-end technology, see
proposition 1, is welfare enhancing even if the ecological effect is much smaller. As
corollary 2 states, the decision whether to subsidize electric mobility also depends
on the value of the future. This connection is deeply discussed by Stern (2006)
and Nordhaus (2007).
4 Conclusion
In the presence of environmental externalities, it can be welfare enhancing to over-
come a technological lock-in via governmental intervention. As our model shows,
this may also hold for a dead-end technology that appears within a process of tech-
nological transition. Within our model, there exists an opposing effect between
environmental benefits of using a cleaner technology and the losses of incompatible
networks. The reduction of environmental externalities enhances welfare, whereas
the network incompatibility reduces the utility for all consumers. The important
parameters within the analysis are the difference of the environmental externali-
ties, the strength of the network effect, and the size of the installed base. Besides,
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the governmental decision whether to subsidize or not also depends on the value
of future payoffs; thus, the discount factor. It is desirable to subsidize the dead-
end technology if its environmental externality is small relative to the one of the
established technology, if the installed base is small, and/or if the strength of the
network effect is small. If future generations matter, which means, if consumers’
and politicians’ discounting of future payoffs is small, then they subsidize a green
dead-end technology.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
As long as D˜(T ) > C(T ), the government has to pay a subsidy sˆ. Since the
network of C grows with each new user, the subsidy can be reduced with time.
Let (as in 7)
sˆ(T ) =

b(2T ∗−T )
r
− b
r2
, for T ∗ ≤ T ≤ 2T ∗ − 1
r
0, for T ≥ 2T ∗ − 1
r
. (40)
Then, for T ∗ ≤ T ≤ 2T ∗ − 1
r
C(T ) + sˆ(T ) =
a+ b (T − T ∗)
r
+
b
r2
+
b (2T ∗ − T )
r
− b
r2
(41)
=
a+ b · T ∗
r
= D˜(T ), (42)
and all users choose C. If T ≥ 2T ∗ − 1
r
, then sˆ(T ) = 0 and C(T ) > D˜(T ), and all
users choose C. 
Proof of Proposition 1
To proove proposition 1, we have to calculate the status quo welfare WN for the
scenario without subsidy
WN =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
t
(a+ b · τ − D)e−r(τ−T ) dτ dt (43)
=
(2b+ (a− D)r)erT ∗
r3
(44)
and WS, where the government pays subsidies according to lemma 1.
WS =
∫ T ∗
0
(∫ T ∗
t
[a+ b · τ − D]e−r(τ−T ) dτ (45)
+
∫ ∞
T ∗
[a+ b · T ∗ − D]e−r(τ−T ) dτ
)
dt (46)
+
∫ ∞
T ∗
∫ ∞
T ∗
[a+ b(τ − T ∗)− C ]e−r(τ−T ) dτdt (47)
=
r(aerT
∗ − D(erT ∗ − 1)− C − 2bT ∗) + 2bT ∗erT ∗
r3
(48)
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For D − C ≥ 2bT ∗,
C − D + 2bT ∗
r2
≤ 0⇐⇒ WN −WS ≤ 0⇐⇒ WN ≤ WS (49)
holds. 
Proof of Lemma 2
As long as D˜2(T ) > C2(T ), the government has to pay sˆC . Since the network of
C grows with each new user, then sˆC is also a function of T .
Let (as in 20)
sˆC(T ) =
b(2T ∗ − T )
r
− b
(
1− 2p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) − 2(1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
. (50)
Since δ < ln(2)
r
,
b(2T ∗ − T )
r
− b
(
1− 2p · e−r(2T ∗−δ−T ) − 2(1− p) · e−r(2T ∗+δ−T ))
r2
>0⇐⇒ (51)
D˜2(T )− C2(T ) > 0⇐⇒ D˜2(T ) >C2(T ), (52)
and all users at T ≥ T ∗ choose C. 
Proof of Proposition 2
To proove proposition, 2 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For 0 < p < 1, −2b[T
∗·er(T∗+δ)+(1−p−p·e2rδ)δ]
1−p−er(T∗+δ)+p·e2rδ > 0 holds.
Proof: Since e
r(T∗+δ)−1
e2rδ−1 > 1 and as per assumption, 0 < p < 1
1− p− er(T ∗+δ) + p · e2rδ < 0
always holds. Since T
∗·er(T∗+δ)+δ
(e2rδ)δ
> 1 and as per assumption, 0 < p < 1
T ∗ · er(T ∗+δ) + (1− p− p · e2rδ)δ > 0
always holds. Therefore, since −2b < 0,
−2b[T ∗ · er(T ∗+δ) + (1− p− p · e2rδ)δ]
1− p− er(T ∗+δ) + p · e2rδ > 0
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holds. 
Now, we can proove proposition 2.
Proof: Since e
−r(2+δ)
r2
> 0 and D − C > −2b[T ∗·er(T
∗+δ)+(1−p−p·e2rδ)δ]
1−p−er(T∗+δ)+p·e2rδ > 0,
e−r(2+δ)
r2
[
(D − C)(1− p− er(T ∗+δ) + p · e2rδ) (53)
+2b(T ∗ · er(T ∗+δ) + (1− p− p · e2rδ)δ)] < 0⇐⇒ (54)
W −Wsˆ < 0⇐⇒ W < Wsˆ (55)
holds. 
Proof of Corollary 1
δ˜
δb
=
−2(T ∗ · er(T ∗+δ) + (1− p− p · e2rδ)δ)
1− p− er(T ∗+δ) − p · e2rδ (56)
Proof: See proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Corollary 2
δ˜
δr
=
2b · erδ(−p(T ∗ − δ)2 · er(T ∗+2δ) + (p− 1)(−4pδ2 · erδ + (T ∗ + δ)2 · erT ∗)
(−1 + p+ er(T ∗+δ) − p · e2rδ)2
(57)
Proof: Since b > 0,
2b · erδ
(−1 + p+ er(T ∗+δ) − p · e2rδ)2 > 0. (58)
Since T ∗ > δ,
− p(T ∗ − δ) · er(T ∗+2δ) < 0, (59)
and
(p− 1)(T ∗2 · erT ∗ − pδ2 · erδ + 2T ∗δ · erT ∗ − 2pδ2 · erδ (60)
+δ2 · erT ∗ − pδ2 · erδ) < 0⇐⇒ (61)
(p− 1)(−4pδ2 · erδ + (T ∗ + δ)2 · erT ∗) < 0. (62)
Therefore, δ˜
δr
< 0 holds. 
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Proof of Corollary 3
δ˜
δT ∗
=
2b · er(T ∗+δ)(er(T ∗+δ) + p(r(δ − T ∗)− 1) · e2rδ + (p− 1)(1 + r(T ∗ + δ))
(−1 + p+ er(T ∗+δ) − p · e2rδ)2
(63)
Proof: Since b > 0,
2b · er(T ∗+δ)
(−1 + p+ er(T ∗+δ) − p · e2rδ)2 > 0. (64)
Since
er(T
∗+δ) − 1 ≥ p(e2rδ − 1)⇐⇒ r · er(T ∗+δ) ≥ r − pr + pr · e2rδ ⇐⇒ (65)
δ(er(T
∗+δ))
δT ∗
≥ δ(−p((r(δ − T
∗)− 1) · e2rδ + (p− 1)(1 + r(T ∗ + δ)))
δT ∗
, (66)
and
lim
r,T ∗,δ→ 0
er(T
∗+δ) = 1
and
lim
r,T ∗,δ→ 0
−(p(r(δ − T ∗)− 1) · e2rδ + (p− 1)(1 + r(T ∗ + δ))) = 1,
er(T
∗+δ) > −(p(r(δ − T ∗)− 1) · e2rδ + (p− 1)(1 + r(T ∗ + δ)))⇐⇒ (67)
er(T
∗+δ) + p(r(δ − T ∗)− 1) · e2rδ + (p− 1)(1 + r(T ∗ + δ)) > 0 (68)
(69)
holds.
Therefore, δ˜
δT ∗ > 0 holds. 
20
References
Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by
historical events. The Economic Journal, 99:116–131.
Bento, N. (2010). Dynamic competition between plug-in hybrid and hydrogen
fuel cell vehicles for personal transportation. International Journal of Hydrogen
Energy, 35:11271–11283.
Birke, D. (2009). The economics of networks: a survey of the empirical literature.
Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(4):762–793.
Conrad, K. (2009). Engines powered by renewable energy, the network of filling
stations and compatibility decisions. Jahrbu¨cher f. Nationalo¨konomie u. Statis-
tik, 229(4):362–381.
David, A. D. (1985). Clio and the economics of qwerty. The American Economic
Review, 75(2):332–337.
Economides, N. (1996). The economics of networks. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 14:673–699.
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1986). Installed base and compatibility: Innova-
tion, product preannouncements, and predation. Amercian Economic Review,
76(5):940–955.
Greaker, M. and Heggedal, T.-R. (2010). Lock-in and the transition to hydrogen
cars: Should governments intervene? The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy, 10(1):Article 40.
Ko¨hler, J., Wietschel, M., Whitmarsh, L., Keles, D., and Schade, W. (2010).
Infrastructure investment for a transition of hydrogen automobiles. technological
Forecasting & Social Change, 77(8):1237–1249.
Nishihara, M. (2010). Hybrid or electric vehicles? a real options perspective.
Operations Research Letters, 38:87–93.
21
Nordhaus, W. (2007). A review of the ”stern review on the economics of climate
change”. Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3):686–702.
Sartzetakis, E. and Tsigaris, P. (2005). Environmental externalities in the presence
of network effects: Adoption of low emission technologies in the automobile
market. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28(3):309–326.
Schneider, M., Schade, B., and Grupp, H. (2004). Innovation process ’fuel cell
vehicle’: What strategy promises to be most successful? Technological analysis
& strategic management, 16(2):147–172.
Schwoon, M. (2007). A tool to optimize the initial distribution of hydrogen filling
stations. Transportation Research Part D, 12:70–82.
Stern, N. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Struben, J. and Sterman, J. D. (2008). Transition challenges for alternative fuel
vehicles and transportation systems. Environment and Planning B: Planning
and Design, 35:1070–1097.
Witt, U. (1997). ”lock-in” vs. ”critical masses” - industrial change under network
externalities. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15:753–773.
22
